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The events in and around Tiananmen Square in May
and June of 1989 can best be understood in the context
of a severe and generalised crisis within China's
political institutions. That crisis was in part triggered
by economic problems following the partial liberal-
isation and modernisation of China's economy after
1978, but it was essentially political in character.
Indeed, the laws governing the institutional dynamics
of socialist states in Europe and Asia are of a very
particular brand and require a decisive devaluation of
the role of the very factor that has been elevated to a
pre-eminent position by Marx himself - the
economy.
At most times, and especially in times of crisis, China's
political institutions do not operate according to the
rules set out in law and in the government's and the
Communist Party's formal statements. Instead, they
function according to informal rules which render
political institutions incapable of adapting and
responding to the kinds of change that occurred after
1978, except through the deployment of coercive
force. This incapacity of political institutions, together
with the fictional character of public discussions of
institutional operations, had a destructive impact
upon political discourse and the possibility of dialogue
between the regime and those in Chinese society who
had found a voice in the 1980s. It was impossible for
those in power and the Tiananmen protesters even to
define each other and to communicate with each other
in any meaningful way, and the ghastly results are
well-known. To grasp all of this, we need to examine
both the condition of China's political institutions
and, more broadly, the character of political discourse
and political imagination in China.
Unbuilding the Institutions
It is commonly accepted by all, including Chinese
leaders of every faction, that modernisation in
bureaucratised economies and societies such as theirs
will be a painful process. In the social rearrangements
inevitably accompanying this process, conflicts, even
violent conflicts, seem unavoidable because the
discretionary monopoly of the hitherto ruling group is
threatened, and various hitherto privileged groups like
workers or cadres are in danger of being marginalised.
In the socialist world, these modernising reforms have
generally gone through two phases. In the first phase,
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which China experienced between late 1978 and the
mid-1980s, the newly unleashed forces of a liberalised
economy secure substantial growth rates and
contribute to a general atmosphere of optimism and
even buoyancy. In the second phase, which China has
experienced since the mid-1980s, the long-term
structural problems of these economies and polities
make themselves felt; problems that cannot be solved
by patching and mending.
During the first phase, things are relatively easy, but in
the second phase, the viability of the entire state
structure is put to the test. We then discover whether
the state is able to manage the inevitable conflicts by
protecting contesting social groups from each other's
worst (and best) impulses, and whether it is able to
channel society's energies in a manner that contributes
to the long-term solution of the problems.
China's 1989 crisis did not begin with the army
marching into Tiananmen Square. In March, Prime
Minister Li Peng had announced an austerity
programme to cope with the mounting economic crisis
and a return to stronger state control over the
economy. Indeed, since the inflationary rises in 1987, a
sense of crisis had been driven home, especially to the
state employees with their fixed salaries and to people
in poor agricultural areas far from the cities and trunk
lines.
Well before the massacre in and around Tiananmen
on 3 and 4 June, the various institutions of the
government had ceased to operate normally. The
cause was not within the government itself, but rather
within the leadership of China's ruling Communist
Party. There, various factions and groupings were
engaged in a fierce battle for control, the outcome of
which would decide the future direction, personnel,
and operations of all of the institutions involved. A
closer look reveals that even the institutions of the
Party Centre were not actually in control. The Party
has legal institutions to handle such issues as
appointments and policy guidelines, but in times of
serious conflict, they instantly collapse, giving way to
completely different and highly unpredictable methods.
In this case, the public learned from the Party
Secretary, Zhao Ziyang, that in fact control over
policy was even beyond his level. In a televised talk
with Mr. Gorbachev, Zhao declared that the relations
between the Soviet and Chinese parties had not been
Political Institutions, Discourse and Imagination
in China at Tiananmen
reformalised during their talks - that is, between the
two Party General Secretaries - but a few hours
before, when Mr. Gorbachev met Deng Xiaoping who
held no senior party post. At the Party Congress in
1987, Zhao declared that the party would refer in all
major decisions to Deng and a group of old cadres
convened by him. Institutionally, Deng was head of
the Party's Military Commission. The other members
of this top group like Peng Zhen, Bo Yibo, Wang
Zhen, Li Xiannian and Chen Yun are no longer formal
members of either the Party Centre or the government,
but belong to the various advisory groups who
technically have no voting powers. The reason why
these old cadres were invited to join in the policy
making group was not their institutional importance
but the fact that they had built up, over decades,
patronage systems in the civilian and military realms
which enabled them to bolster their voice with the
promise of delivering the support or the opposition of
their cohorts.
The viable institutional leaders like Li Peng and Zhao
Ziyang thus had little or no discretionary power. The
actual decision making was done in a body that had no
formal institutional standing, the existence of which
was revealed only by a disgruntled Zhao and he was
promptly accused of leaking the secrets of the last
Party Congress to Mr. Gorbachev. The personal
patronage networks which provided the basis for the
actual leadership's powers were essentially independent
of political beliefs. This type of loyalty is owed in
China under the following conditions:
Appointment received under the leadership or
by the intervention of the given leader, an example
being the heads of the military regions which for
the most part have been appointed through Deng
Xiaoping's influence in the military commission,
and have been selected from his original military
unit.
Work under a given leader; an example being
the many people who had worked under the former
and now late Party Secretary Hu Yaobang when he
was head of the Youth League.
Admission into the Party on the recom-
mendation of a given leader; Hu Yaobang provides
a good example as he recruited a large part of the
present middle-level leadership into the Party
through the Youth League.
Family ties, either through blood or marriage;
the details about state president Yang Shangkun's
extended family have been widely reported; Li
Peng is Zhou Enlai's adopted son, the new Party
secretary Jiang Zeming is Li Xiannian's son-in-law.
(y) Same province of origin; an example is the
grouping Deng Xiaoping, Yang Shangkun and Li
Peng, all of whom are from Sichuan province.
Another example is the Shanxi clique around Xi
Jianxun.
(vi) Graduates of the same class in the military
academy, etc.
Institutions, accordingly, have no weight of their own
in China. Their role and prestige is a direct function of
their head's position in the invisible power structure of
the Centre. This stands in radical contrast to a system
such as that which prevailed, for example, in the
French Third and Fourth Republics. There, dozens of
governments manned by different party combinations
succeeded one another at a rapid pace, while the
professional administrators in the state institutions
went on plying their trade, efficiently and unperturbed.
Those administrators differed greatly in their political
philosophies, but they shared a professional ethic and
some political principles, among which was a
commitment to basic freedoms and to the ongoing
centrality of power under their direction. By sheer
inertia, they blocked radical transformations planned
by various governments. At the same time, the
separation of powers between the courts and the
bureaucrats safeguarded the citizens against abuses by
the bureaucrats. This diffusion of power among
political, legal and bureaucratic authorities was
remarkably flexible in responding to the challenge of
modernisation in France, mainly because it permitted
competing models of adaptation to co-exist and to
compete. It also created enough latitude for a more or
less rational discourse to occur amid the competition
of the various powers and models.
In the People's Republic of China, the structure of
politics prevents such a diffusion of power.
Technically speaking, it is even illegal. The state
constitution contains the Four Basic Principles. These
were articulated by Deng Xiaoping himself in 1979, on
the basis of a Maoist precedent from the fifties. The
Principles are as follows: the leading role of the
Communist Party; Marxism Leninism Maoism as the
fundamental doctrine; the socialist system as the
guiding system for relations of production; and the
'democratic dictatorship of the people' as the
instrument to deal with the 'enemies of the people',
that is counterrevolutionaries, a category now
reserved for the participants in the democracy
movement. In practice, this means that the National
People's Congress and the government are led by the
Communist Party. The Supreme Court and the other
courts also operate under the four basic principles so
that they must follow the directives of the Party
leadership, and the same is true for the various
sections of the executive.
In a crisis like the one experienced by the Chinese body
politic since 1987, and in particular in May and early
June of 1989, the implications of this arrangement
become vividly apparent. The separation of powers,
which the formal constitutional order appears to
promise, does not in fact exist. One day after the
Tiananmen massacre, the Supreme Court published a
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statement requesting the speedy arrest, trial and
punishment of all those involved in the 'counter-
revolutionary turmoil'. The potential of the Court to
act as a buffer, protecting both the leadership and the
people against the hysterics of the other is forfeited.
There is no possibility to go to court against the
military commanders of the units involved in the
massacre or against individual soldiers who wantonly
shot pedestrians in the week following 4 June. The
Supreme Court did not shirk its real duties in doing
this, but exactly fulfilled its duties, namely to follow
the leadership of the Party in defining the disturbances
as 'counterrevolutionary turmoil' and then applying
the 'dictatorship of the people' to the treatment of
those involved, which meant execution or long prison
terms.
Parliament (or the National People's Congress) might
have been a second institution to mediate in the
conflict between the leadership and the people. There
had in fact been attempts to make it into an instrument
for the representation of popular demands. Among
the most outspoken theoretical advocates had been
Yan Jiaqi, a political scientist with the Academy of
Social Sciences. On the occasion of its meeting in
March 1989, he petitioned in a published article for it
to have a stronger supervisory role vis à vis the
government. The budget for the year, he argued for
example, is submitted to parliament fully three
months after the government has started to act on it.
The 1987 budget, furthermore, was changed con-
siderably by the government without any parlia-
mentary consultation. This, he suggested should be
changed.
Wan Li, a member of the Politburo, heads the
parliament. During the last weeks before the
massacre, he was on a visit to the US and Canada.
From there, he sent various telegrams in substance
approving the demands of the students whom he
termed patriotic. He broke off his trip and returned
home prematurely, warning his relatives in the US
before leaving that he might find himself arrested
upon arrival. He was hospitalised in Shanghai and not
permitted to go on to Beijing until he had publicly
supported the imposition of martial law, and on
Wednesday, 8 June, he appeared with Deng Xiaoping
and others to congratulate the military for their heroic
victory on Tiananmen. He had intended to call a
meeting of the standing committee of parliament to
discuss the crisis. People set great hopes by such a
meeting which legally could have deposed Li Peng. In
Nanjing, 600 students began a walk on 1 June over the
1000 kilometres to Beijing to arrive on the scheduled
date to present their request to dismiss Li Peng. The
preconditions for summoning such a special meeting
had long been met, but it was abruptly called off,
obviously at the behest of Deng Xiaoping and in spite
of legal problems, since Deng is not a member of the
body whose meeting he cancelled.
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When the meeting eventually took place, an important
proposal for a new press law which would have given
greater leeway to the papers was taken off the agenda,
and the legality and legitimacy of the Tiananmen
massacre was never mentioned. Technically, parliament
heard without discussion the report by Li Peng, and
approved it. Yan Jiaqi, the political scientist who
suggested that parliament be made a powerful
representative institution is now on the most wanted
list for conterrevolutionary crimes. Happily, he has
made his way to Paris.
The formal institutions of the executive branch also
had next to no influence during this crisis. The
Minister of Defence was opposed to the use of the
military, but the army was called in by the Military
Commission of the Communist Party headed by Deng
Xiaoping, overruling the minister who is not a
member of this body. Nor were minimal legal norms
observed. Police arrested and paraded on television a
number of suspected 'counterrevolutionaries'. Charges
against them were in many cases legally invalid. One
man was charged with 'spreading rumours' which
certainly is no legal offence in the Chinese criminal
code, but he was jailed. Another man was arrested for
having made a speech demanding the abolition of
one-party rule. Freedom of speech is guaranteed by
the Constitution, but so is the leading role of the
Communist Party. He was defined as a 'counter-
revolutionary' which implies a heavy penalty. Within
the leadership's understanding of the institutional
structure, all of this was precisely according to the law,
including the call by the Supreme Court to disregard
niceties of legal detail and proceed to a speedy
judgement and execution for the criminals.
As to the press, it comes institutionally under the
control of the Propaganda Department of the Central
Committee, as do the arts including literature, cinema
and theatre. The stated purpose of the press is to
educate the masses in the spirit of the latest Party
directives. Within the leeway allotted by these
directives, individual papers can operate without
going through central censorship. If, as is the case
since the Third Plenum of December 1978, the
directive describes bureaucratism as an obstacle to
desirable economic development, bureaucratism may
be denounced. However, since bureaucratism is
defined as a left-over from the old society, statements
asserting, for example that the state structure set up
according to the Soviet model engenders bureaucratism
are unacceptable and therefore unpublished. Since the
end of the Cultural Revolution a number of
institutions have sprung up that could have been
legalised. Consider, for example, the independent
journals and newspapers. They were a part of the
democracy movement between 1977 and 1979. After
they had served their purpose by supporting Deng
Xiaoping's bid for power against Hua Guofeng, they
were outlawed and closed. Some of their authors were
invited to write for official publications, and others
like Wei Jingsheng and Wang Xizhe were jailed or put
into labour camps.
This is not to say that there have been no independent
publications, rather that the Party Centre continuously
kept them in the shadow of illegality and could at any
moment intervene when it felt this necessary. The
Shanghai-based Shijie jingji daobao. (World Economic
Herald) may illustrate this. The paper is edited by the
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, and has
featured some of the more independent reporting and
discussion in China in recent years. After failing to
support the crackdown in late 1986 and early 1987, six
of its editors were fired. When it again failed to toe the
Party line after the death of Hu Yaobang, Jiang
Zemin, then Shanghai's Party Secretary and now the
new general secretary of the Party, sent a 'leading
group' to straigthen out the paper. When the
journalists failed to comply, the paper did not appear.
The editor-in-chief was sacked long before the army
crushed the demonstrations in Beijing. He was
technically accused of 'violating Party discipline'. He
is a Party member, which was the condition for his
becoming the editor-in-chief, and by failing to abide
by the directives of the leadership he indeed violated
Party discipline. He is an old man already, and has
been put under house arrest while one of the younger
men actually running the paper is on the most wanted
list of intellectuals sought by police for counter-
revolutionary activity.
During the days immediately preceding the 1989
crackdown, the content of all published papers shifted
daily in direct reaction to who controlled the Party
Centre. The head of the propaganda department was
Hu Qili, who did not support martial law. Thus the
papers reported jn a very friendly manner the actions
of the students. Li Peng then set up a special media
committee consisting of his spokesman and advisor
Yuan Mu as well as another man he personally trusted.
Although institutionally, this unit had no existence, it
took over from Hu Qili, who also held no government
position. It turned the press and television into a desert
of official proclamations and denunciations, showing
the degree to which the entire media depended on
informal channels of control. The authority of the
committee was derived from the fact that Deng
Xiaoping backed Li Peng. Li Peng backed Yuan Mu,
and thereupon a simple Central Committee member
overrode a member of the Standng Committee of the
Politburo. The state organs played no role whatsoever
in this.
It should be clear by now that the new Party leadership
after 1978 failed to build institutions that were able to
mediate, diffuse or solve conflicts without resorting to
the use of tanks, even though these leaders anticipated
prolonged and intense conflicts. In fact, the policy of
Deng Xiaoping has been less a failure to build such
institutions than an active unbuilding of such
institutions, even thöugh these institutions were
constantly growing in the public imagination. During
the post-1978 decade, there was steady pressure for the
establishment of such institutions. The parliament or
National People's Congress tried to become more than
an applause machine for Party decisions; the
government organs tried to professionalise themselves
and become less dependent on day-to-day Party
directives; the papers tried to diversify and develop in
new and more independent directions. And there were
demands to make the courts less dependent on Party
directives. All of these trends reflected a tendency
visible, and in small part, accepted in the economic
realm. They cried out for an institutional lease of life.
Their instiiutional consolidation, however, has been
actively prevented, to the extent that even accepted
institutions of government and the Party Centre were
undermined by way of secret decisions which ensured
that actual powers rested in the shadowy world of the
retired old men around Deng Xiaoping.
In them, the problem of the Chinese state structure is
epitomised. Most of them hold no direct institutional
position at all, but wield thei.r power through
patronage networks. The huge importance of
individuals and the unimportance of institutions in
China today is vividly apparent here. The successful
pursuit and implementation of a policy depends not
upon the strength and weight of the institution
promoting it, but rather upon the person advocating
it, and it will fall with the demise of this person.
Political Discourse and Political Imagination
at Tiananmen
A similar distance separates appearance from reality
in the workings of another key political institution, the
Communist Party. And as we shall see, this and the
charades discussed above have done enormous
damage to political discourse and to channels of
communication between state and society. The Party's
constitution outlaws the formation of cliques or
factions. As everyone knows, however, these factions
exist and form the main organisational structures of
power. This ban on forming factions means that the
operation of the various factions is driven into a verbal
underground. No one can claim adhesion to a certain
faction as his reason to operate in a certain way;
activity which is perfectly possible in a multi-party
system. No one can claim the interests of a certain part
of the population as a rationale for his or her policies.
The legitimacy of controversial discourse in public as
well as within the Party is thereby eliminated. In a
Party of some 48 million members it can be assumed
that the various interests in society, be they
geographically or socially based, will be represented
- an argument in fact advanced by the leadership
against the necessity of a multi-party system.
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However, the lack of legitimacy for advocating
particular and even parochial interests openly, and the
heavily enforced and verbalised homogeneity of the
Party do not permit such a representation of interests.
There is always and in any polity a strong tension in
politics between the rationale given for a policy or
decision and the complex motives and compromises
actually going into the decision. Still, the appearance
of rationality is maintained and any demonstration
that the official reasons were by disguises for ulterior
interests is often considered devastating. Under
Chinese institutional conditions, the conflict between
the official rationale and the actual decision-making
process is as fundamental as it is illegal to mention it
publicly. The Hong Kong and Taiwanese papers, from
a greater familiarity with cultural patterns, base all of
their political analysis on the factions and alliances
formed under the above-mentioned criteria. Therefore,
they are illegal contraband in China. Even if their
perceptions are not altogether correct, these
assumptions certainly inform the reading of the
Chinese public and its political class.
The political discourse of the country is soured by this
perception. Any news, any argument profferred,
theory proposed or historical fact challenged is read as
a potentially devious expression of some political
purpose, and thereby stripped of its claim to
rationality, which in turn would have made it
challengeable on rational grounds. The political
discourse is thus driven into the verbal underground of
silent, symbolical or coded communication. While
Pekinology might be an esoteric field in the West, it
certainly is mass fare in China. Does a leader wear
Western clothes or the Sun Yatsen suit? What type is
used to set a specific article? Who is photographed
with whom in published photographs, and how do the
persons photographed look at each other? Is there a
difference between the printed and the performed
version of a theatre play? The forms of esoteric
communication developed to discuss controversial
political issues are as old as they are endless in their
variety.
In point of fact, China's institutions have been most
effective over the decade leading up to Tiananmen at
divesting themselves of their discretionary powers.
Their partial self-dismantling freed substantial social
forces that threw themselves into modernisation. The
drive for this partial divestment of discretionary
powers emanated from the reform leadership itself,
and therefore was not in need of mediating
institutions. The conflict, however, between the
independent aspirations of parts of the populace and
the Centre was constantly present, although only in a
latent form. The various political campaigns against
spiritual pollution and bourgeois liberalisation during
the last decade showed a slowly rising temperature in
the contention. But when the Party Centre was
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confronted by the Beijing population and a substantial
part of the political class with independent criticisms
of mismanagement and demands for institutional
reform that would have transformed a paternalistic
command structure into a contractual structure, this
self-dismantling by Party and state institutions left no
structures through which to communicate, to mediate
and to engage both sides in a negotiated settlement.
As this crisis developed, it turned out that both sides
assumed and perceived the essential and, as far as the
Party was concerned, deliberate inability of China's
state and Party institutions to handle the stresses of
modernisation and adaptation. This came as more of a
surprise to Westerners used to the roles played by their
own institutions rather than Chinese conditions. The
protesters never seriously tried the institutions, and
the Party Centre treated them with the same disdain by
languidly discarding them. And the members of the
institutions themselves, well aware of their marginal
existence, ceased to function even in their limited
ways. The massive body of state and Party institutions
with their officials, papers, forms and language, with
stability and continuity suggested by their sheer size
and weight, turned out to be rather ethereal and highly
unstable structures. They were subjectively and
objectively unable to adapt to the new challenges from
below, and they were paralysed by the dissonance in
the Party Centre itself.
Both sides were thus stranded for the occasion in an
institutional desert, facing each other on Tiananmen
Square. They had no well established categories with
which to define each other and each others' actions,
and to communicate with each other and the public at
large. Confronted with this situation they were
searching in the imaginary stock of their historical and
social experience for the words, the precedents and the
model actions to express their concerns, to prop up
their spirits and to earn themselves some legitimacy.
The students had a substantial problem defining
themselves. Many of them wore the white headbands
popularised by the Japanese, Koreans and Philippinos.
In the Chinese context this meant that they were not an
organisation challenging the Communist Party, but
the unarmed and non-violent masses articulating their
basic aspirations. At the same time, this device likened
the government to the Marcos regime, a brutal
dictatorship basing its power on a mighty military
machine and characterised by an extreme degree of
personal corruption. Their legitimacy came from
world opinion which had denounced Marcos, and
their perspective and hope from the Philippinos'
peaceful transition to democracy. In Beijing University,
a photo exhibition in April and May showed many
pictures from the Philippine revolution, by way of
precedent. Institutionally, this was a very broad and a
very foggy construct taken from the imaginary world
of the foreign post-socialist revolutions.
Their organisational forms - that is, the independent
unions of the students, the workers and the
intellectuals - were taken from another stock, the
Polish Solidarnosc experience. This implied an entire
scenario, namely the broad and nearly complete
popularity of the movement, the potential for a brutal
crackdown such as that perpetrated by General
Jaruselski, and the final demise of Jaruseiski's
socialist junta a few years later. The Solidarnosc
model assumed that the military and the Party would
be willing to go along with a crackdown. It contained
an ironic dialogue with Deng Xiaoping himself. On
the occasion of the last major student protest, in
December 1986, Deng had spoken approvingly of
Jaruseiski for having saved the Poles from their own
self-destructive urges through his intervention.
Coming back to the Polish experience in 1989, with the
dramatic changes in Poland happening exactly at the
height of the conflict in China, the students and
workers took Deng at his own word by projecting
what would happen to him if he copied Jaruselski.
Of course, China is neither Poland nor the Philippines,
but in this manner the students saw themselves and
portrayed themselves as part of an irresistible world
trend. The hunger strike as the ultimate means of
pleading for a rapid and serious dialogue was another
imported symbol. The standard song of all participants
in this movement was, strangely enough, the
Internationale. Those who sang it were not aware that
the song referred to the Communist International, but
read the entire text afresh. Read unhistorically, it is
indeed a song where the damned of the entire earth
encourage each other to fight for the days of glory to
come, socialism and communism not being mentioned.
The song thus undermined the Communist Party's
claim of having achieved a revolution which solved all
problems. Tactically, it permitted the singers to stay
within the confines of state-ordered communist
discourse. These modern and foreign models were
important and useful, but they only integrated a much
older Chinese tradition with the imaginary of the
world.
Some 60,000 students from all over the country
converged on Beijing to support the Tiananmen
Square occupation, which for a long while was the
only important thing to happen. Many later actions in
the regions were explicitly undertaken in support of
the Tiananmen Square action. The Square was chosen
not only because it is a big place near the seat of the
Party Centre with large crowds coming by, but
primarily because it is the symbolic centre of the
nation. The heroes who had died for the revolutions
since 1840 had their monument on its central axis, and
behind it stands the Mao Zedong Memorial Hall
dedicated to the ideological mainstay of the republic.
The axis running through Tiananmen is again older
than the People's Republic. It goes back to the last two
dynasties. The emperor sat on this axis facing south,
and the new rulers have taken his place on the
Tiananmen gate, facing south on solemn occasions.
By occupying the Square, the students and citizens
held the heart of the nation and symbolised their
representativeness which they could not demonstrate
through opinion polls or elections.
There was no particular directionality in the
occupation of the place. But when the conflict
sharpened during the last ten days before the
crackdown, the students from the arts institute built
the statue of the 'goddess of democracy' there. It was
stationed right on the imperial axis, being the first
structure on this axis seen from Tiananmen Gate, and
it faced north. Two other structures also broke the
north-south orientation of the axis, and presented
some sort of challenge to the Centre's leaders' place on
Tiananmen Gate. The Heroes Memorial raised the
question of whether they had kept faith with the many
who had given their lives; Mao Memorial hall raised
the issue of whether Deng Xiaoping was still loyal to
the Chairman's legacy. Placing the goddess of
democracy in front, and facing north, challenged the
leaders with a new notion of primordial and
international importance-democracy. In the appeal
inscribed on the streamer next to this goddess, as well
as in some articles, it was made clear that this goddess
represented the aspirations not just of the Chinese, but
of the Asian peoples' quest for democracy, reinforcing
the Philippine connection. The statue again defined
the imaginary other as the feudal, autocratic and
militaristic authority in the palace of the Party Centre.
In fact, the palace today is only a museum and an
amusement park. The offices of the Centre are to the
left in Zhongnanhai. But Tiananmen had been
depicted as the heart of the nation in poems, on
stamps, in guidebooks, and at the beginning of each
evening's television news. If the palace was not the
actual seat of the Centre, there was an imaginary
emperor sitting there and being challenged.
There is an old tradition in China, according to which
officials and commoners, even foreigners could gain
direct access to the emperor in case of a great wrong.
They would proceed to the entrance of the palace,
where there was a big drum, the dengwen zhi gu, the
drum that can be heard above. They would beat the
drum, and a censor on duty would come running out,
take the writ, and bring it straight to the inner quarters
of the emperor who would have to deal with the matter
with great dispatch. The institution was a safeguard in
moments of institutional collapse. Only people who
had tried all other avenues of remonstrance and
redress and had failed to right the wrong were allowed
to use this last instrument. The occupation of
Tiananmen Square straight in front of the imaginary
palace door, and the demands to the government
voted upon in that place were presented to the
government in the language of a largely imaginary
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imperial institution. All institutions had been tried,
they had failed to right the wrong (usually corruption),
so now the emperor and the common citizen had to
confront each other directly. The demand for direct
and continuous dialogue between citizens and
government leaders (that is, Li Peng or other members
of the Politburo) only epitomised the perceived
absence and/or collapse of mediating institutions.
The death of the former Party secretary Hu Yaobang
played an important role in triggering all of this. In
March, there had been a resolution calling for the
release of Wei Jinsheng and other political prisoners,
signed by many and prominent intellectuals, a first in
the history of the People's Republic. There had been
signs, however, that Hu Yaobang was coming back.
He had not been dismissed from the Politburo, and in
March, Zhao Ziyang had himself photographed with
him and had the picture printed in the People's Daily.
After a bitter controversy in the Politburo, Hu
Yaobang died of a heart attack. In the personalised
structure of Chinese politics, where the individual
leader counts for infinitely more than the institution
he might be heading, Hu Yaobang seemed to be the
only top leader with a record qualifying him to guide
the country through the crisis. He had been head of the
Youth League for decades, and in this function had
promoted a good number of fairly outspoken young
men and women into the ranks of the Party. He had
managed the rehabilitation of the victims of the
Cultural Revolution and of the Anti-Rightist
Campaign. He had suggested most of the more daring
new slogans like 'seeking truth from facts' and had
supported a much stronger divestment of Party
control over government affairs. In addition, he was
one of the very few leaders about whom no stories of
nepotism circulated. His death closed what people saw
as the last personal avenue of communication open to
handle the economic and social crisis of the country.
The occupation of Tiananmen began with the
unofficial mourning ceremony for Hu Yaobang. Next
to his large portrait that had been dedicated by the arts
college students and hung on the Heroes' Memorial,
another smaller picture was mounted. It showed Hu
Yaobang with the inscription. 'China's Bao Longtu'.
Bao Longtu was a judge under the Song dynasty.
Known for his daring uprightness, sense ofjustice and
willingness to listen to the complaints of the common
people, he had become a proverbial figure with many
traditional operas depicting his exploits. Two huge
streamers, appended to balloons, floated on the
Square mourning Hu as 'Zhongguo zhi hun', the soul
of China.
On the same day that this unofficial mourning took
place on Tiananmen, three student leaders proceeded
to the Great Hall of the People where the official
mourning ceremony was held. They knelt down in
front of the door, knocked their heads on the floor,
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and asked to see the Prime Minister in person. They
remained there for three hours. Li Peng refused to see
them. In terms of symbolic action in a world where all
sides see each other only as embodiments of imaginary
constructs, the three student leaders scored an
important point. They had stressed the urgency of the
crisis and maintained an unquestionably non-violent
and non-threatening posture, thereby proving the
purity of their motives and methods. Had Li Peng
received them, he would have accepted their claim. By
not receiving them, he made the public accept it and
made himself appear to be a corrupt minister presiding
over the last and desperate hours of a waning dynasty,
like a well-known figure from the Southern Song.
Through this symbolic encounter, Li Peng was
transformed from an awkward Soviet-trained engineer
into an historical monster.
The students were using historical forms from the Han
and the Song dynasties - when student demon-
strations against corrupt government broke out that
had been vindicated by history although those
demonstrations had often been brutally suppressed.
The students' performance as historical actors in roles
from the stock of a hybrid imagination appears to
have been highly successful in mobilising the hybrid
imagination of the wider modern Chinese public, with
its combination of traditional and Western images.
The Party Centre was in greater trouble in its
imaginary role playing. It operated on the traditional
assumption that people are by nature greedy,
egotistical and oblivious of national interests, and
therefore in sum self-destructive if left to their own
devices. The idea is best expressed through the
standard metaphor used by the old imperial officials
for the people. The people are like river waters. In
China, the great rivers are diked up, and if they break
through the dikes, much disaster and destruction
follows. They revert to their productive function only
after a strong hand has forced them back behind the
dikes of virtue. Economic liberalisation after 1978 had
whetted their material appetites and they became
receptive to Western ideas which support this moral
depravity instead of combatting it.
In their view, the worst disasters happen when leaders
in the Party Centre tolerate, support or even
encourage such spontaneous and irresponsible
outbursts instead of suppressing them. This happened
during the Cultural Revolution when Mao supported
the Red Guards. It happened in late 1986 when Hu
Yaobang refused to clamp down on the students, and
it happened in 1989 when Zhao Ziyang opposed the
use of the Army to restore calm. In the perception of
Deng Xiaoping, China is an extremely unstable entity.
Stability cannot be established through a contract
between governing and governed, but only through
paternal authority, which uses strict punishment as an
educational device. The standard formula for the
traditional bureaucrat's relationships with the people
was that he was to be the 'father and the mother of the
people'. The Party Centre sought to take ort this role.
Relationships between parents and their children in
China are not contractual, but give full authority and
responsibility to the parents. Thus the Centre sent
money to treat the students on hunger strike, and
visited them in the hospital, and even on Tiananmen.
They called them constantly 'our beloved children',
implying their immaturity and need for parental
control.
This aspect was combined with utmost rigidity in
matters of political substance. The crackdown with
tanks and machine guns fits in as the fatherly
punishment within this metaphorical construct. The
means used were not dictated by the visible threat
posed. A dike breaks because first a little dribble of
water leaks out. If this hole is not plugged, the
destruction will be immeasurable. The means used on
Tiananmen were chosen with regard to an imaginary
outcome, not with regard to the few hundred students
who were still there on Saturday, 3 June, and who
furthermore had voted the day before to go back to
school on Monday. The crackdown was eventually
jusified, in a translation into modern language, as one
directed against a 'counter-revolutionary' onslaught.
Both sides in this crisis drew and draw on a common
stock of imaginings, in terms both of institutions and
experiences. This recourse to the imagination in
crafting and instrumentalising one's role and
perceptions is not unique to China. What is
distinctive, however, is that this imaginary and
symbolic interaction offers no mechanism in the real
world which might deflate the oversized mutual
perceptions, and the actions based thereon, and link
them to the sober ambiguities of real life. The Chinese
Communist Party has all too neatly slipped into the
roles and metaphors of the traditional state and has
with devastating efficiency eliminated all those entities
that could help to navigate through the crisis. It is a
bitter irony now to hear it said that without the
leadership of the Communist Party, China would be
done for.
A caricature in the Shanghai Xinminwan bao in late
May, 1989, showed an axe proudly standing amidst
felled trees, proclaiming itself to be the only operative
entity.
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